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APR 27 1962

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170007-5

CHICAGO, ILL.  
TRIBUNEMORNING 854,085  
SUNDAY 1,157,232

APR 27 1962

# PILOT POWERS DEFENDED BY ALLEN DULLES

BY RICK DU BROW

Hollywood, April 26 (UPI) — Allen Dulles, who has been called America's master spy, defended U-2 pilot Francis Powers and the reason for supporting the Cuban invasion in an hour long television interview tonight.

In a forthright manner, the former chief of the central intelligence agency revealed some "little known cloak-and-dagger details on CBS Reports.

He recalled being introduced to Nikita Khrushchev at a dinner. "Oh, yes, I know you," Khrushchev said. "I read your reports." Dulles replied: "I hope you get them legally." He

said Khrushchev countered that all governments pay the same agents.

## Defends Pilot Powers

Under the adroit questioning of reporter Eric Sevareid, Dulles said he never shared some of the public and press criticism of Powers.

He said he did not think it had been brought out sufficiently that Powers had such a difficult assignment from merely an aviation and navigation basis, it was too much to expect him to also be a top flight undercover man.

"I think, on the whole, he handled himself properly," Dulles said.

## Underground Not Informed

Concerning criticism that there was a failure to recognize Fidel Castro's danger, earlier, Dulles said, "maybe we were slow about it," but asked what one could do about a government that was in power with the approval of its citizens.

Asked about criticism that the invasion was immoral and il-

legal, he said the question was whether a group of men who wanted only to free their country should be told America did not sympathize with them.

Dulles admitted the United States did not inform the Cuban underground about the invasion; he said to do so would have been to tell Castro. He added that very few persons knew about the invasion of France in World War II, to ensure surprise.

As Dulles lit, relit and toyed with his pipe in his Georgetown home, Sevareid deftly drew from him tales of some of his exploits.

## Psychiatrists Are Used

There was the period in Switzerland in the second war when Dulles visited Psychiatrist Carl Jung for help in trying to figure out Hitler's mental reactions—what he might do next, and so forth. The ex-intelligence chief said similar techniques have been used in relation to Khrushchev.

In Switzerland, Dulles kept

Washington informed about the plots on Hitler's life, including the 1944 attempt of the German generals in a briefing barrack. If Hitler had not moved 10 feet, a concealed bomb—which went off—would have killed him. Dulles expressed his disappointment about the affair in a business like way tonight.

## Knew Japan Was Slipping

The master spy also told how messages smuggled to him from the German foreign office enabled America to know of Japan's desperate position before the end of the war and made it possible to help prepare negotiations for an early surrender.

Asked by Sevareid if he thus thought it was necessary to use the A-bomb against Japan, Dulles said he respected the men who made the decision but felt there was a failure to interpret available intelligence as to the ability of the enemy to carry on.

## REPORTS THEFT OF WATCH

Vivian Ross, 3222 Carroll av., told police a wristwatch was stolen from her home.

HS/HC-145

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170007-5

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# Report on Dulles Finds CIA Chief Man of Mystery

By HARRIST VAN HORN

They flew a bold banner over last night's edition of CBS Reports. "The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles," it read.

As a lead-in to an informal conversation with one of the most mysterious, influential and controversial figures of our time, it was a title that promised much. Too much.



Harrist Van Horn

For it soon became clear that what we were privileged to hear—assuming we lingered a while—were the veiled, cryptic and qualified views of the retiring head of the CIA. Perhaps it was idiotic to imagine that a man often called a "master spy" would speak with perfect candor to an audience of millions. Would it not be inconsistent in one long accustomed to speaking in code to nameless, faceless agents from the far reaches of the world?

What with lighting his pipe and turning away sharp questions with sudden puffs of smoke, Mr. Dulles also stepped many questions, offered only partial answers to others. The darting bird of conversation barely got a wing off the ground. And never, in the history of CBS Reports, has any man taken so long to say so little.

Something in the nature of Mr. Dulles inhibits easy discourse. As Oliver Wendell Holmes once said of a famous novelist, "He had the air of his own statue erected by public subscription."

True, Mr. Dulles did unbend a bit when a question contained a suggestion of criticism. But only to the extent that he might justify, refute or offer a tentative footnote. He also displayed a nice talent for the anecdotes that deflects and diverts, leaving the question still in doubt.

Any reporter interviewing Mr. Dulles must, by the rules of his craft, ask some impolite questions about the U-2 incident and the ill-starred invasion of Cuba. Eric Sevareid, a relaxed but dogged questioner, pursued these topics as far as he could. But when the going was rough Mr. Dulles got suddenly busy with his matches.

Appropos the Cuban landing, Mr. Sevareid asked, "Would you tell me . . . where you think the basic mistake was?"

A pause. Then, "The President has said that he assumed responsibility for the action taken. That was his own initiative. . . . I have never discussed the Cuban operation." There followed some vague observations about timing, about Cuban pilots being trained in Czechoslovakia and the U-2's that the MIG's then in crates would soon become operative.

Mr. Sevareid then tried for a discussion of the political and legal basis for the invasion. Mr. Dulles replied that a fine group of patriotic Cubans desired to restore free government to Cuba and that they would get no aid, no sympathy from the U.S.

To the question, Were the U-2 flights worth all the trouble they caused?, Mr. Dulles quoted the Secretary of Defense. Valuable information regarding missiles and aircraft had been obtained.

For Francis Gary Powers, Mr. Dulles had no harsh words. "I think, on the whole, he conducted himself . . . (long pause) . . . properly." No, he did not feel that Powers should have taken his own life.

In introducing Mr. Dulles, reporter Sevareid noted that our entry into the secret intelligence field was, to many minds, "alien to spirit to our open society and alien in practice to the traditional public accountability of government."

In the course of the interview, Mr. Dulles was quizzed on this touchy matter of secrecy. He replied that a subcommittee of the House and Senate Appropriations Committee had for years scrutinized the CIA budget. "We disclosed any information they wanted," the retiring chief added. The committee, moreover, had never betrayed a single secret. One can only wonder: exactly how much were they told? And how much briefing would have been necessary for a proper evaluation of what they were told?

Though the TV camera has an X-ray eye, it is difficult to say why one felt so keen a disappointment in this chat with Mr. Dulles. Certainly he projected the qualities of a decent, kindly man. No bigot, no zealot and certainly no self-dramatizing intriguer, seeing a spy in every phone booth. What one missed was candor, a grace of mind and spirit, and—surprisingly—a sense of broad eruditions.

In the ride of the show, in response to thoughtful questions by Mr. Sevareid, Mr. Dulles declared himself shocked by the obscenity with which among our native witch-hunters. He said he sympathized with the average man who is told, "Here is this great menace. You must do something to stop this menace." But what is he to do?, asked Mr. Dulles. "This has resulted in certain aberrations I don't need to discuss."

Now, there you are. Why not define them? Why waste space on platitudes and generalities?

There have been other CBS Reports devoted to the recollections and opinions of a single man. And how clearly we could see the shadow of the man's mind! But Mr. Dulles went on being . . . a stranger in a cloud of smoke.

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170007-5

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CINCINNATI Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170007-5  
POST & TIMES-STAR

EVENING 274,874

APR 27 1962

# We Spy Too, Allen Dulles Assures Us

BY MARY WOOD

For years, first on radio and then TV, I've gotten the impression that everybody has spies but us. Maybe you remember—there were always hordes of Nazis, Fascists, Communists and Franco agents outwitting our poor unsuspecting citizens any time they got out of bed.

Well, last night, on "CBS Reports" I began to hold up my head again. Eric Sevareid spent an hour with Allen Dulles, our



Mary Wood

former Central Intelligence Agency head man, and I learned that we're not as naive as I had been led to believe, thank heaven.

We have spies, too, and what's more we always did, according to Mr. Dulles.

AS I RECALL, Mr. Dulles retired soon after that abortive Cuban invasion. But, as he said, "Success has a thousand parents. Failure is an orphan."

Between lighting his pipe, which at times seemed to be as successful as the invasion of Cuba, Mr. Dulles rambled on about his career in World War II and later. He impressed me as being a man well acquainted with the unvarnished facts about our danger from Communist Russia, but not unhopeful that the new generations of Russians coming up might possibly want more freedom from their own domination and, as a result, be less of a threat to us.

Among Mr. Dulles' remarks—some hindsight, of course—were: "We were slow about Castro's

HE ALSO SAID, concerning the Big Bomb, "I don't think you can meet this evil by passive resistance. We must meet aggression wherever it appears."

Now that makes sense. All we have to do is remember that Neville Chamberlain's umbrella did mighty little to keep those bombs off England.

Mr. Dulles' articulate reminiscences made a fascinating hour. He cleared up a number of matters, including the U-2 incident, which were somewhat foggy to me. Apparently, that was one of our better spy operations because Mr. Dulles said it was the best-kept secret for five years.

Best of all, I liked the man's parting advice: "Be informed, believe in your

country and don't get alarmed."

A NEW SERIES of Christian education programs for children begins at 9:30 a. m. tomorrow on CH. 12. The series, titled "Break-thru," is sponsored by the Council of Churches of Greater Cincinnati. Each program tells a story common to the experience of most children. The young actors and actresses who appear in the dramas were recruited from TV and the theater.

IF YOU WATCH Ed Sullivan's show, on Sunday, you'll see the performing water birds of the Caribbean Gardens, in Naples, Fla. Of local interest is that this Florida attraction is owned and operated by Julius Fleischmann of Cincinnati.

WKRC-RADIO has signed to carry all the UC home and away football and basketball games next season.

FRANKLIN SCHAFFNER, who directed the show with one of the smallest casts in TV history—"A Tour of the White House with Mrs. John F. Kennedy"—is now directing a show with one of the largest casts, 70 actors.

It's the Show of the Week's two-part production of "The Great American Robbery" which begins Sunday.

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Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170007-5



# What's On?



By BEN GROSS

(Reprinted from yesterday's late editions)

Did you know that Khrushchev has been subjected to long-range psychoanalysis by our Central Intelligence Agency? And that Allen Dulles, former head of the CIA, has used the findings of the scientist Pavlov, who studied the behavior of dogs, in trying to interpret the course and the meaning of Khrushy's actions?

These and other fascinating facts were highlighted by the man who has been called our "master



Eric  
Sevareid



Allen  
Dulles

spy" during the CBS Reports special, "The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles," on Channel 2, 10 to 11, Thursday night.

Dulles explained that, according to the Pavlovian theory, "if you train a dog to respond to three bells—you open a door and ring three bells, and you give him sugar, and then you do that for a month, and then all of a sudden, you open the door and the three bells, instead of sugar, you beat him over the back with a stick.

"The dog's puzzled... doesn't know what's happened and you vary this business, and so forth, and pretty soon, the dog's gone pretty well crazy."

## Fabricated Rage

Khrushchev has applied the same technique in his treatment of us, Dulles said. "Today it's coexistence and everything, and then the next day, it's something else." He cited as examples: Khrushy's violation of the test ban, and the breaking off of the Paris conference with President Eisenhower in 1960 over the U-2, even though he "had known for years that the U-2 was flying."

"All this rage and so forth was fabricated," he pointed out, and "executed in the truly Pavlovian manner." And so was K's shoe-pounding action at the UN.

The former CIA head revealed that he had also used the psychoanalytic approach to Hitler during World War II. He used to consult the great psychiatrist, Dr. Carl Jung, in Switzerland and the latter was "very, very

## Defends U-2 & Powers

Interviewed by newsmen Eric Sevareid, our former intelligence chief, said that:

"The U-2 spy plane flights over Russia had obtained 'most valuable information with regard to missiles, aircraft, other military installations, which were obtainable by no other means.'"

Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the downed U-2, "on the whole had handled himself properly."

His contract did not call for committing suicide in the event of capture; he was employed as an aviator and he was a "great navigator." This task took all of his time and it was impossible that he should combine aviation with being a "great undercover agent."

## Cagey About Cuba

As to the Cuban invasion fiasco, "I'd rather limit my remarks" to pointing out we knew Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia, and that Cuba had Russian MIGs. If these became operative, the possibility of any invasion by a Cuban force, or even by an American force—the dangers and problems would be greatly increased.

We did NOT inform the Cuban underground of the place and the

probably much less of an internal menace here with us than it is with many other countries." But because the average citizen feels frustrated in combatting Communism, he gives way to "aberrations."

What we should do is help to prove our "free system is more effective than the Communist system" and we should support our government in places threatened by Communism, "whether it's Berlin, Laos, or Viet Nam, or wherever it may be."

timing of the landing because of fear of leaks.

(Dulles refused to name the "central basic mistake" made in the ill-fated invasion and did not refer to the last minute withdrawal of air support.—Ed.)

The Russian difficulties with the Chinese are "obviously very serious," but "I don't look forward to a revolution in the Communist world." And yet some of the younger generation in Russia "are going to bring great pressure to get more freedom."

Because of "the vigilance of the FBI and what J. Edgar Hoover has done, Communism is

APR 28 1962

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170007-5

## Radio and Television

# Image of CIA Spy Goes Up in Smoke

By Lawrence Laurent

SPIES, AS ANY television fan will tell you, are handsome young men and women. They run around in enemy countries, wearing disguises and stealing the most vital kind of state secrets. They fight, often with their fists, sometimes with guns and knives and there is always a strikingly attractive member of the opposite sex close at hand.



The portrait, it would seem after looking at the CBS Reports on "The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles" is about as realistic as the notion that Mata Hari could decipher the formula for nuclear fusion.

To one who watched the close study of the apparently serene, highly self-contained former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the most obvious need for espionage is a box of matches. Dulles must have lighted his pipe 50 times during his one-hour conversation with reporter Eric Sevareid. There were times when one might have guessed that the title of the program, really, was "The Hot and Cold Pipe of Allen Dulles."

TO A TELEVISION ad-

dict, Dulles provided the discomfiting news that "not much information" is gotten in the stereotyped, thrilling way. Sevareid asked: "Have you ever committed any act of violence in your whole life?" Dulles struck a match, puffed twice and responded with a flat, matter-of-fact "No."

He declined to answer several questions about the Cuban invasion and for an evaluation of the U-2 "spy flights" over the Soviet Union, he quoted the Secretary of Defense's testimony to a Senate Committee.

Dulles was most forceful when he discussed his own attitude toward U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers. Dulles said he had never shared the public or press criticism of Powers' behavior after capture by the Russians.

Dulles said: "I think, on the whole, he handled himself (long pause) — uhh — properly."

Powers is an aviator and a navigator, Dulles continued. "To expect to make of him a fine espionage agent was just not possible."

THE FORMER CIA chief reacted strongly to the suggestion that nobody checks on the activities of the CIA. Dulles said a House Appropriations Subcommittee had gone over CIA budgets "and we ex-

plain every item." He added that Rep.

I AM TOLD by those who are expert in such matters that Dulles actually revealed nothing on television that is not already known to those who study the CIA.

The value of this interview, then, was to furnish a portrait of the philosophy and the career of a man who has led a fascinating life. It was the picture of a man of obvious courage and strength and one who had some rather good advice about the internal menace of Communism. He said that the American people should "study Communism" and "understand it." Study, he added, would show that our free system is "more efficient and more effective" than Communism. Finally, he said, we "should rally together to defend our positions."

Sevareid summarized the advice this way: "Be informed. Believe in your country and, as the late Elmer Davis put it, 'Don't let them scare you.'"

Dulles signed off the hour with the words: "I'd like to leave it at that."

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170007-5

## Princeton Opens New Dulles Library; Eisenhower Lauds Late Secretary



On hand for the library dedication at Princeton University were Mrs. John Foster Dulles, and, standing, from the left: Adlai E. Stevenson, United States representative to the United Nations; Allen W. Dulles, former head of

the Central Intelligence Agency; Arthur H. Dean, United States representative at the Geneva disarmament conference; former President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Dr. Robert F. Goheen, Princeton president.

By CLARENCE DEAN

Special to The New York Times

PRINCETON, N. J., May 15 — More than 2,000 persons filled the Princeton University Chapel today for services dedicating the John Foster Dulles Library of Dip-

lomatic History. Spoken for by former President Dwight D. Eisenhower eulogized the late Secretary of State as a world leader and churchman. "This is a better world today because of him," General Eisenhower said. The library,

a two-story hexagonal wing of the university's Firestone Memorial Library, houses the personal papers of Mr. Dulles from 1953 to 1959, while he was Secretary of State. Shortly before his death in 1959, he gave the papers to

his alma mater for the purposes of furthering bona fide research in the fields of history, political science, international relations and related subjects." Friends of

[Cont'd]

Mr. Dulles provided funds for constructing the annex. The papers, as well as a collection of copies of official documents of the State Department during his tenure, are in about twenty filing cabinets in the basement of the wing.

On the ground floor there is a reading and work room sixteen feet on each of its six sides, twenty-five feet across and twenty-five feet high. Four windows give an outlook on the campus.

The wing, which like the main library is of granite brick, was designed by the architectural firm of O'Connor & Kilham. It adjoins the rare book section. Access to the Dulles collection will be restricted to scholars.

#### Other Speakers at Service

Besides General Eisenhower, speakers at the one-hour dedicatory service were Dr. Robert F. Goheen, president of Princeton; Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, president of the Union Theological Seminary, and Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, United States delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was to have attended, but sent a statement instead. Dr. Goheen explained that developments in Laos had prevented the Secretary's leaving Washington.

Also present were Mrs. Janet Dulles, Mr. Dulles' widow; Allen W. Dulles, his brother and former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and other members of the family.

General Eisenhower, who said he felt he had been closer to Secretary Dulles than anyone except the Secretary's family, spoke nostalgically of the association.

"Within six months, starting in 1953," he said, "there developed between Foster Dulles and me a trust, a common faith, that was never for a second broken."

"We soon began to work in a most informal manner. There were notes and telephone calls, but mostly we had conversation. Every day in the late afternoon, about 5:30, he came over to my office, and we talked."

General Eisenhower spoke of Mr. Dulles' faith in international morality, and added, "I sincerely and earnestly agreed with his thought."

#### All U. S. Is In His Debt

"Every single member of this audience, and all of the United States, is in his debt," the former President declared. "To his character, insight and courage I owe a terrific debt. This is a better world today because of him."

Secretary Rusk, in his statement, which was read by Dr. Goheen, said that out of the papers stored here in Princeton will come a picture of a dedicated man, deeply committed to the peace and well-being of his own country and deeply, as well, aware that the fate of his own country was linked to that of peoples in the remotest parts of the world.

Ambassador Dean, who was a law partner of Mr. Dulles, recalled the Secretary's deep attachment to Princeton, where he was a member of the Class of 1908.

"I recall his enthusiasm when the idea of the library was discussed," Mr. Dean said. "All his life he cherished Princeton."

Dr. Van Dusen described Mr. Dulles as "at base a profoundly religious man, a man of a righteous and dynamic faith."

Dr. Goheen said the library would serve "not only as an enduring monument to the man, but as a living and working instrument."

Dulles also touched on two other delicate subjects:

►The U-2 Affair: "I never shared some of the public and . . . press criticism of the U-2 flights."

Powers "didn't think of the whole he handled himself properly." Dulles, however, was not asked nor did he explain why the government followed a very favorable impression of Powers to circulate for eighteen months and that I

► Cuban admitted that the CIA's role in the Cuban intervention had gotten out of hand, Dulles said, when the agency takes on paramilitary operations, "all its operations should be confined to what could be kept quiet and behind the curtain type." He suggested why the invasion failed: "The U.S. moved too hastily." ■

Strolling along with Savaris, Dulles mentioned that after Cuban President Kennedy had said, "Is there a mother and parents and father is an orphan." "Sometimes," said Allen Dulles, "I feel a little like an orphan." Then he added: "But there have been successes, too."



Sevareid and Allen Dulles: But there have been successes, too

# Dulles' Answers

FORMER CENTRAL Intelligence Agency head, Allen Dulles, recently provided many answers to controversies of his somewhat spectacular career in a televised interview. Perhaps some of these points had been made before, but never in such a positive or convincing manner.

Of course the theme of the interview was to discuss policies in general plus specific successes as well as well-publicized failures of the CIA.

For example, in discussing various CIA "projects," Dulles reminded the interviewer that such a decision—or any other major policy that could change the shape of the world—must come from the executive-in-chief. It was emphasized that no such policy in a democratic government such as ours could be effected without the President's approval.

He also pointed out—since this controversy still is of immediate interest—that the U-2 reconnaissance flights were not being conducted without the knowledge of some members of Congress. It has been commented that such projects, which could endanger our national security, should not be carried out without the knowledge of Congress.

Dulles said that his agency answered ALL questions asked by Congress' committee on the budget and that this committee was well aware of the U-2 activities—"In fact, they approved the budget for it."

Dulles inferred that the U-2 may have been the best kept secret the United States ever has had. When asked if any of the CIA "secrets" ever have been "leaked" by any members of Congress, who would have access to the information by virtue of their membership on committees, Dulles emphatically said,

"Never!" It often has been felt that many Congressmen could not be trusted with such information—but Dulles' comment should at least reassure the doubters that such a charge is unfounded.

As to U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, Dulles added a new comment in Powers' defense. He felt that in discussing Powers' conduct as a prisoner of the Soviet Union it should be remembered that Powers was a "great pilot and navigator" and was not trained for espionage. "Under the circumstances, Powers conducted himself properly," Dulles stated.

Regarding the Cuban incident, Dulles said his agency was aware that Cuba possessed a number of MIG aircraft still in crates and pilots in training in Communist Europe. The CIA also was aware that any invasion, no matter what element of surprise it had in the point selected for the invasion, was likely to fail if the Castro government got these planes into service by the time of the invasion. Unfortunately, Castro did.

Another point of controversy regarding the CIA concerns charges of conflict between CIA activities and those of our State Department. Dulles emphatically answered that these activities were "never" in conflict in any way.

Dulles, now retired, has had a fascinating productive career. Books and articles have been written about him, more undoubtedly will follow. Any discussion of his contributions to our nation's well-being would take far more space than could be permitted on an editorial page.

DULLES IS truly a great American. His frank and objective comments—not necessarily all included here—about his failures as well as his successes would seem to prove that.

MAY 2 1962

EVENING 705,599  
SUNDAY 694,768

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170007-5

MAY 2 1962

# *The Philadelphia Scene . . .*

By RUTH SOLTZBERG

THERE WAS AN INTERESTING little dinner last weekend at the Italian Consulate on Locust st. To the party came Allen Dulles, former director of the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency, and Mrs. Dulles.

Also at the dinner given by Consul-General Edgardo Sogno del Vallino and Countess Sogno were Mr. and Mrs. H. Gates Lloyd, of Haverford and Washington; Mr. and Mrs. George M. Cheston; Hobson Pittman, Henry P. McIlhenny and Loelia, Duchess of Westminster.

Mr. Dulles and Count Sogno first met in 1944, as World War II raged in Europe. Count Sogno was a member of the Italian underground's supreme command. Mr. Dulles was with the Office of Strategic Services. They saw each other in Switzerland.

Later, Edgardo Sogno was taken prisoner by the Nazis. Allen Dulles saved his life. In arranging for the surrender of German troops in Northern Italy, Mr. Dulles insisted that he would not negotiate unless the lives of Count Sogno and a half-dozen other Italian partisan leaders were spared.

"He saved us from the firing squad," said Edgardo Sogno.

## Much-Maligned CIA Chief Provides Some Wise Advice

Allen Dulles, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, spoke candidly of his career as America's super spy chief when he was interviewed last week by Eric Sevareid in a nationwide telecast.

It was interesting to hear Dulles' explanation of the Cuban invasion. He was criticized for his part in that strategy and the criticism was the most severe of his career. We joined in the criticism and we believe much of it was thoroughly justified.

Dulles, however, did an excellent job of presenting his side of the coin and he also made it clear that he was prepared to accept responsibility for the invasion's failure. Dulles said it was President Kennedy's own decision to assume full responsibility for the plan even though he was not chief executive during the early stages of the strategy.

**MORE INTERESTING** was the ex-CIA chief's comments about Castro. He said the CIA was aware of the Cuban revolution's close ties with communism fairly early in the career of Castro and that top administration leaders were given reports on it.

But, Dulles noted, what could be done? Castro was moving against Batista and toward Havana with the enthusiastic support of a vast majority of Cuban citizens. The United States could have prevented Castro from taking over only by backing Batista or by invading the island and taking over itself.

Most would agree with Dulles that either course would have been unthinkable.

**DULLES ANSWERED** clearly another criticism that the anti-Castro underground was not informed of the time and place of the invasion.

It wasn't, he said, and neither was the French underground informed of the time and place of the Normandy invasion during World War II. To have informed the underground in either instance would have been to risk informing the enemy and this is simply not a proper risk in surprise operations.

hysterical anti-communism fervor sweeping some areas of the country and affecting a great many citizens in most localities.

This is a result, Dulles said, of the realization by most Americans that communism is indeed the greatest menace to freedom that Americans have faced in the history of their nation.

There is an intense desire on the part of patriotic Americans to be up and doing something about it, and the frustration of being unable to grapple directly with the enemy leads many citizens to an extreme position.

**HOW CAN** we best be good Americans and fight the fight against the Communist menace?

Dulles says first of all that we need to become as informed as we can about communism. Becoming informed, however, does not mean casting a suspicious eye toward our neighbors, attacking our institutions of government without proof and practicing character assassination on public leaders with whom we may not always agree.

Secondly, we need to practice democracy. Practicing democracy means becoming active in the civic and political affairs of our city, county, state and nation. We can, by making our form of government work well, effectively fight communism.

Thirdly, we should not panic at Communist threats. Many extremists spend most of their time repeating threats that the Communists have made and gasping over them. How this helps democracy and the cause of freedom is hard to understand.

**OUR SYSTEM** of government is the best man ever devised to protect freedom. We do not need to apologize for it nor attempt to tear it apart and reshape it into some sort of extremist Utopia.

And here, we believe, Dulles sounded the keynote. The best way to fight communism or any other "ism" either as an external or internal threat is to make our democracy stand before the world as the invincible bastion of freedom forged by the free hands of free men.

**ALSO WE** felt Dulles made some astute observations about the almost

APR 29 1962

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*Hitler, Khrushchev, Cuba, and the U-2*

# 'America's Master Spy' Recalls His Wins and Losses

Allen, Welch Dulles has been called "America's Master Spy." For more than eight years, from 1953 until his retirement late last year, he headed The United States Central Intelligence Agency. During World War II he was an intelligence officer in Europe. His agency's occasional failures often made him the center of controversy.

Few people are more qualified to discuss the nature and methods of the Communist menace. With this in mind, CBS News correspondent Eric Sevareid chatted for an hour with Mr. Dulles last Thursday evening on the television program, *CBS Reports*. Their talk ranged from Cuba to the Congo, from Nikita Khrushchev to Adolf Hitler. Here are the highlights:

**Mr. Sevareid:** Mr. Dulles, when Khrushchev was here, did you get a chance to talk with him at all?

**Mr. Dulles:** Yes. I didn't have a long talk with him, but I had a very — quite an amusing encounter with him. It took place at the dinner that President Eisenhower gave for Khrushchev, and the President introduced him, and said: "This is Mr. Dulles. You may know Mr. Dulles." He turned to his reporters, kind of a twinkle in his eye, because he's got a keen — you must admit, he's got a good sense of humor, and he said: "Oh, yes, I know you. I read your reports."

**Mr. Sevareid:** Really?

**Mr. Dulles:** Yes. And I said: "I hope you get them legally." And, "Oh," he said, "you know, you know how we get them. We all pay the same agents and we all get the same reports." And, "Well," I said, "That's kind of sharing the wealth, isn't it?" And then we had a laugh and that ended it.

## The Briefcase Bomb

**Mr. Sevareid:** Did he mean your public or your private reports?

**Mr. Dulles:** Ah, he never told me. I think he had in mind that he read agent reports.

**Mr. Sevareid:** Do you think it's possible that he has?

**Mr. Dulles:** Every once in a while somebody gets caught, but that game goes both ways.

**Mr. Sevareid:** Mr. Dulles, would it be accurate to say that because of your work in World War II, in Switzerland, Washington kept informed on plots against Hitler's life?

**Mr. Dulles:** They knew about the last plot. I did have the details of the last and most serious plot that almost succeeded on July 20, 1944. Hitler was having a briefing at the time. He was up on the East Front in East Prussia, and he was having his regular morning briefing, and Stauffenberg, who had the bomb, was in the room. He was — had a special message for Hitler, so he was admitted. He put the bomb down in this briefcase against a leg of a table. It was a — you know, one of those long tables that are in barracks with legs at various intervals. He put it down on the leg nearest to where Hitler was. Here was a long map, 20 feet or



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more long, with maps of the East Front, the West Front, and so forth, and so on. And Hitler was being briefed there, and just before the bomb went off, Hitler went off here to see how the front was, let's say, in Pinsk, and that took him 10 feet away from the bomb. The bomb went off and he was blown out of the building, but he wasn't seriously wounded. It was a shack — it was just a barracks there.

**Mr. Sevareid:** It must have been a great disappointment to you and every one else?

**Mr. Dulles:** Well, it was. I was waiting to see whether they'd get hold of the radio that day, and they never got hold of the radio. You know, that's one of the modern revolutions — one of the great things to note is, have they got control of the radio, and again and again as I've sat back, either when revolutions were upcoming, the indication to you as to whether one side or the other is winning, is who has got control of the air?

**Mr. Sevareid:** You apparently knew very early in '45, Mr. Dulles, that the Japanese were in very bad shape. How did you know that?

**Mr. Dulles:** Eric, at that time, I had access to information that was reaching the German Foreign Office... messages from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, the German Air Attache and the German Army Attache. Those cables showed, very

Navy. By the end of '44 and early '45, their position, both air and sea, was becoming almost untenable, far more than the public realized. Word came through to me from certain Japanese sources with whom I was in contact, that the Japanese would like to find a way of negotiating for a surrender.

They made quite interesting proposals, and as a result of these proposals I was asked to go up to Potsdam in the time of the Potsdam Conference, when President Truman met there with Stalin, you remember, and Churchill. I took to (Secretary of War Henry) Stimson, at that time, the proposals that had come through this channel with regard to an early Japanese surrender.

## Were A-Bombs Necessary?

**Mr. Sevareid:** Do you think that the dropping of those first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary in terms of bringing about the Japanese surrender?

**Mr. Dulles:** Well, that's an awful hard question to answer. I have the deepest respect for the men who made that decision. I do feel that there was a failure to interpret available intelligence as to the extent of the Japanese collapse, and their inability really effectively to carry on the war.

**Mr. Sevareid:** Is there anything you'd like to say, Mr. Dulles, about the pilot of the U-2, Francis Powers?

**Mr. Dulles:** I never shared some of the public and maybe of the press criticism of Powers. While it was difficult to tell until after we — the agency — had talked with him and had made (our) report how well he had done, I think on the whole he handled himself properly. You must remember that he was an aviator. He was a great navigator. He had a very difficult assignment merely on the aviation navigation side and to expect of him — to make of him a great undercover agent was impossible — one of these two professions took all a man's time — all a man's concentration and thought and I'm not sure that point has been brought out fully enough.

## No Suicide Commitment

**Mr. Sevareid:** Mr. Dulles, some people said that the pilot, Mr. Powers, should have taken his own life. Is there any way you can have a man sign a contract to commit suicide?

**Mr. Dulles:** No — no — you couldn't — first place, it would be ineffective, of course. In the second place, I think it would be immoral and we just didn't do it. We said, "Here, you have this. If you get into a situation where you think that death is better than what awaits you, use it."

**Mr. Sevareid:** Mr. Dulles, about the foulup on all the explanations of the U-2 affair when it first happened. The Government went through a lot of agony. We looked very silly. Now, is it necessary that we go through all that? Do we have to explain?

**Mr. Dulles:** I doubt whether, in the two

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170007-5

situations to which you probably refer, one the U-2 and the other Cuba, probably, too—one could have ever rested on the answer "No comment."

I mean this: Do we have a kind of a government here that would let, say, me, as then Director of Central Intelligence, send an airplane, even 70,000 feet high, over Russia? Is that a responsible kind of government? Or mount an expedition, or have something to do with an expedition for the training of Cubans that were going to Cuba? It seems to me that that kind of thing can only be done with the approval of the highest authority, and the American people or the world began to think that we had a government here where that kind of thing could be done without approval by the highest authority.

There might be a feeling of uneasiness, that there are some people here who could do things that might lead to serious international complications without knowledge at the highest level. So could the President have declined knowledge of these situations, or said, "I won't say anything about them?"

**Mr. Severeid:** Mr. Dulles, there's been much criticism that we took much too long to recognize the danger of Castro and tried to do something about it.

### Timing Vital in Cuba Attack

**Mr. Dulles:** Maybe we were slow about it. Certainly we got disturbed about Castro at a fairly early date, but what were you going to do about it? Castro was in there, with the great support of the majority of the people, and if we had planned any expedition at an earlier date, that might not have been of any more success than the one that we did after rather mature preparations.

**Mr. Severeid:** Mr. Dulles, if you can, would you tell me, in regard to the Cuban affair of last spring, where you think the central basic mistake was?

**Mr. Dulles:** I'd rather limit my remarks to pointing out that there were certain factors which bore upon the timing of any operation if it was carried out—namely, that we knew that Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia, that MIGs were in crates in large numbers in Cuba and that if these trained pilots got back and these MIGs became operative, the possibility of an invasion by a Cuban force, or even by an American force, would be greatly—the dangers and the problems would be greatly increased.

**Mr. Severeid:** But what about the philosophical and the legal argument that the Cuban invasion was both immoral and illegal?

**Mr. Dulles:** Well, I think I'd respond to that by asking you a question. Here you had a group of fine young men—these Cubans—formed the brigade that went into Cuba, who asked nothing other than the opportunity to try to restore a free government in their country, who were ready to risk their lives and have done so, whether they should have been told that they would get no sympathy, no support,



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no aid from The United States. That's the question.

**Mr. Severeid:** Is it true that we did not inform the Cuban underground in Cuba of the date—the place and the timing of that landing?

**Mr. Dulles:** Eric, we didn't inform them. As I recall, we informed very few people when we started the invasion of France in June of '44. You can't do that. We did not inform the Cuban underground of the time and place of the invasion. To do so would have been informing Castro and it would have been catastrophe for the invading force.

**Mr. Severeid:** We did achieve some element of surprise, did we?

**Mr. Dulles:** Complete surprise was achieved as regards the place of landing.

**Mr. Severeid:** But not timing, because that was published.

**Mr. Dulles:** No they did not know the exact timing. They had been crying invasion for weeks and months before, and as you note, they're even now crying that invasions are being planned.

**Mr. Severeid:** Mr. Dulles, some Europeans—Jean Monnet, for example—say that Americans are much too obsessed about Russian communism. Do you think this is true?

**Mr. Dulles:** I think that is true, in a

sense, and not true in another sense. I think that the one grave peril that we face is the Communist peril. That is the only peril to our freedoms, to our institutions, to everything that we hold dear. Now, I think that it is true that the Communists practice on us and on other countries towards which they're directing their attack, they try on us what I would call the overload theory. They will start a lot of petty annoyances in various parts of the world, without knowing whether they are going to seriously push them ahead, in order to divert our attention, maybe, from the major points of their attack.

**Mr. Severeid:** Could you give any concrete examples of what has turned out to be minor or major?

### South Vietnam Threat Serious

**Mr. Dulles:** Well, I think we overrated the Soviet danger, let's say, in the Congo. They went in there with great fanfare. They supported Gizenga. They established a Lumumba Institute in Moscow, and it looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt to take over in the Belgian Congo. Well, it didn't work out that way at all. Now, maybe they intended to do it, but they didn't find the situation ripe, and they beat a pretty hasty retreat.

**Mr. Severeid:** Would you call Vietnam a serious threat or just a tactical operation?

**Mr. Dulles:** No, I think that's a serious threat. I consider South Vietnam of a major importance, and not just one of the overload theory type of operations.

**Mr. Severeid:** Don't (the Russians) already have perhaps too much on their plate? They can't control Albania, or Yugoslavia, or China—all Communist systems and states. May it not be that a pluralistic communism around the world would be anti-Moscow?

### Freedom Alive in Russia

**Mr. Dulles:** That's quite true, but difficulties at home have rarely stopped countries in foreign adventure, sometimes has pushed them on. I believe that the splits, the fissures, the differences between various Communist countries is today one of the greatest preoccupations that Khrushchev has.

After all, he said what he calls the socialist world, if the world becomes all socialist, they'll all live—lie down in peace, and live together. Well, that isn't what's happened, and when you see little Albania, practically throwing out the Russian representation there, both civil and military, that is really something. Why they went, hard to tell; obviously, at that time they felt that they would have to use force to stay, and they didn't want another Hungary on their hands at that moment.

A new generation is coming on in Russia, and I have a feeling that some of the younger generation of Russians, as they learn more about what goes on in the rest of the world, are going to bring great pressure to get more freedom. They'll want to hear your radio and see your tele-

on. They'll want to learn what goes on the rest of the world. They'll begin to get the best of the whole history of Russia.

They've having a terrible time now in getting out their histories. What do you say about Stalin? Twenty-five years of rule. Twenty-five years the great hero. Stalingrad. Stalin in the tomb. In 1956, came out the great speech of Khrushchev's—denigrating Stalin, but they never dared let that speech circulate in Russia. They leaked little parts of it and they had to go back to the attack now—that was at the Twentieth Party Congress—but the Twenty-second Party Congress, these had to go back to the attack, because they hadn't gotten over to the people.

Mr. Severeid: Wasn't it your agency that got hold of that speech originally?

Mr. Dulles: I'm willing to accept that charge. Khrushchev charged me with it at one time. You'll find it in one of his statements back two or three years ago.

Mr. Severeid: Well, you have to rank that rather high among the accomplishments.

Mr. Dulles: I think it was one of the really important accomplishments.

Mr. Severeid: Mr. Dulles, I know the problem of communism inside The United States is not—has not been under your jurisdiction, but the FBI, but what are your feelings about it? Is it a serious matter?

### *Red Menace Exaggerated*

Mr. Dulles: Well, I think that's due to the vigilance of the FBI and what J. Edgar Hoover has done, it's probably much less of an internal menace here with us than it is with many other countries. I think that the frustration of the American citizen and of the citizens of other countries who are told, "Here's this great menace. You must do something to meet this menace." And yet the ordinary man, the man in the street, the man and woman, he doesn't know how he can contribute.

He agrees as to the judgment that there is a menace, that our society is menaced by communism, but what's he to do, and that has resulted in certain aberrations that I don't need to define, because you and those who are listening and hearing and seeing will probably know what I have in mind, and I think a great many innocent people without realizing the harm they are doing, they get led astray by this.

Well, now, there's certain things one can do. In the first place, we ought to learn what we can about it. We can do it by understanding that our great strength is showing that our system, our free system, is more efficient and more effective than the Communist system, and we all, on these issues, we will rally together in support of the actions our Government has taken strongly to defend our positions where they may be threatened by communism, whether it's Berlin, or Laos, or Vietnam, or wherever it may be.

Mr. Severeid: Mr. Dulles, would this be a fair summation of your recipe for the average American? Be informed. Believe in your country, and as the late Elmer Davis put it, "Don't let them scare you."

Mr. Dulles: I'd like to leave it at that.